the slope of the Blue Mountains. The ascent is not steep,
3. That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind, is what everybody will allow. And it seems no less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended or combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose), cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them.- I think an intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this by any one that shall attend to what is meant by the term exists, when applied to sensible things. The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed- meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was an odour, that is, it was smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a colour or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the like expressions. For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is percepi, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.
4. It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the fore-mentioned objects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived?
5. If we thoroughly examine this tenet it will, perhaps, be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of abstract ideas. For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived? Light and colours, heat and cold, extension and figures- in a word the things we see and feel- what are they but so many sensations, notions, ideas, or impressions on the sense? and is it possible to separate, even in thought, any of these from perception? For my part, I might as easily divide a thing from itself. I may, indeed, divide in my thoughts, or conceive apart from each other, those things which, perhaps I never perceived by sense so divided. Thus, I imagine the trunk of a human body without the limbs, or conceive the smell of a rose without thinking on the rose itself. So far, I will not deny, I can abstract- if that may properly be called abstraction which extends only to the conceiving separately such objects as it is possible may really exist or be actually perceived asunder. But my conceiving or imagining power does not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. Hence, as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual sensation of that thing, so is it impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it.
6. Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, viz., that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind, that their being is to be perceived or known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some Eternal Spirit- it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a spirit. To be convinced of which, the reader need only reflect, and try to separate in his own thoughts the being of a sensible thing from its being perceived.
7. From what has been said it follows there is not any other Substance than Spirit, or that which perceives. But, for the fuller proof of this point, let it be considered the sensible qualities are colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, etc., i.e. the ideas perceived by sense. Now, for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is a manifest contradiction, for to have an idea is all one as to perceive; that therefore wherein colour, figure, and the like qualities exist must perceive them; hence it is clear there can be no unthinking substance or substratum of those ideas.
8. But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be things like them, whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind in an unthinking substance. I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure. If we look but never so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas. Again, I ask whether those supposed originals or external things, of which our ideas are the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or no? If they are, then they are ideas and we have gained our point; but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a colour is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something which is intangible; and so of the rest.
9. Some there are who make a distinction betwixt primary and secondary qualities. By the former they mean extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity or impenetrability, and number; by the latter they denote all other sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth. The ideas we have of these they acknowledge not to be the resemblances of anything existing without the mind, or unperceived, but they will have our ideas of the primary qualities to be patterns or images of things which exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance which they call Matter. By Matter, therefore, we are to understand an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist. But it is evident from what we have already shown, that extension, figure, and motion are only ideas existing in the mind, and that an idea can be like nothing but another idea, and that consequently neither they nor their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving substance. Hence, it is plain that that the very notion of what is called Matter or corporeal substance, involves a contradiction in it.
10. They who assert that figure, motion, and the rest of the primary or original qualities do exist without the mind in unthinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge that colours, sounds, heat cold, and suchlike secondary qualities, do not- which they tell us are sensations existing in the mind alone, that depend on and are occasioned by the different size, texture, and motion of the minute particles of matter. This they take for an undoubted truth, which they can demonstrate beyond all exception. Now, if it be certain that those original qualities are inseparably united with the other sensible qualities, and not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted from them, it plainly follows that they exist only in the mind. But I desire any one to reflect and try whether he can, by any abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion of a body without all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moving, but I must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere else.
- and ran like a hare, her yellow silk dress gleaming in
- we show unity for our cause.” The conversation got heated—to
- Pixar was a haven where Jobs could escape the intensity
- was his small attempt to assert the principle in a limited
- rising, was gradually flooding the cave of the dragon.
- at DreamWorks. “When Jeffrey was still running Disney
- other words, the tone at each place was set at the top,
- house in the Holmby Hills section of Los Angeles. The Edge
- golden dragon. Max pulled the keys from his pocket, and
- magic as allowing computer-generated raindrops to refract
- in London, the agreement with Apple was unraveling. Jobs
- Disney. But after he left for DreamWorks, he stayed in
- They were approaching the river, and there was a fog to-night!
- U2 in an ad, but Jobs pushed back a bit. Apple didn’t
- The singer said he was ready to try to put the deal back
- “I’m going to pick him up myself in my Maserati,”
- often among the blooms beneath the great moon—the black-haired,
- that it had been pitched to him by a development director
- rumors that DreamWorks might be making its own computer-animated
- know what that meant. “Doing rubbishy things for money,”
- all the inhabitants came down to the beach to see us pitch
- to fend off Jobs, who was still having second thoughts.
- a note and attached it to the last item, saying, “Pain
- it, as in (APPLE)RED. “I don’t want Apple in parentheses,”
- to tell him that she loved him. A dozen times she thought
- of fans,” Bono replied, “so couldn’t the next phase
- “We had a song called ‘Vertigo’ that featured an
- more gently, both with each other and even with Jobs. In
- barter. Money was scarcely worth anything, but their eagerness
- in partial silhouette with the usual silhouette of a dancing
- Disney. But after he left for DreamWorks, he stayed in
- Jobs insisted. Bono replied, “But Steve, that’s how
- unlocked the door at the foot of the steps. He turned,
- and they don’t work.’” A few days later Jobs relented
- Chicago Tribune music critic. “The ‘devil’ here is
- Bono, the lead singer of U2, deeply appreciated Apple’s
- and was clear of the oily water, now, and upon a sort of
- it said. “We’re both a bit drunk, and we’re happy
- an animated insect movie when he decided to produce Antz
- Ive and John Lasseter shared the talent to connect art
- out to be lignite of little value, in the sandstone (probably
- a royalty from each iPod sold. Vincent assured him that
- they liked what we were doing with iTunes, and they thought
- was there, along with U2’s manager, Paul McGuinness.
- his boys had deserted, for a hunting party from the bungalow
- was something I very much hoped I would live to resolve.”
- black iPod with a deep red click wheel, and I say okay,
- don’t think it’s going to happen,” Jobs said. “They
- and the girl's mind was in such a turmoil that she had
- U2 in an ad, but Jobs pushed back a bit. Apple didn’t