side of the road is bordered by scrubby trees of the never-failing

wagging tailthanks2023-11-30 15:53:41 7275 6

16. But let us examine a little the received opinion.- It is said extension is a mode or accident of Matter, and that Matter is the substratum that supports it. Now I desire that you would explain to me what is meant by Matter's supporting extension. Say you, I have no idea of Matter and therefore cannot explain it. I answer, though you have no positive, yet, if you have any meaning at all, you must at least have a relative idea of Matter; though you know not what it is, yet you must be supposed to know what relation it bears to accidents, and what is meant by its supporting them. It is evident "support" cannot here be taken in its usual or literal sense- as when we say that pillars support a building; in what sense therefore must it be taken?

side of the road is bordered by scrubby trees of the never-failing

17. If we inquire into what the most accurate philosophers declare themselves to mean by material substance, we shall find them acknowledge they have no other meaning annexed to those sounds but the idea of Being in general, together with the relative notion of its supporting accidents. The general idea of Being appeareth to me the most abstract and incomprehensible of all other; and as for its supporting accidents, this, as we have just now observed, cannot be understood in the common sense of those words; it must therefore be taken in some other sense, but what that is they do not explain. So that when I consider the two parts or branches which make the signification of the words material substance, I am convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to them. But why should we trouble ourselves any farther, in discussing this material substratum or support of figure and motion, and other sensible qualities? Does it not suppose they have an existence without the mind? And is not this a direct repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable?

side of the road is bordered by scrubby trees of the never-failing

18. But, though it were possible that solid, figured, movable substances may exist without the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies, yet how is it possible for us to know this? Either we must know it by sense or by reason. As for our senses, by them we have the knowledge only of our sensations, ideas, or those things that are immediately perceived by sense, call them what you will: but they do not inform us that things exist without the mind, or unperceived, like to those which are perceived. This the materialists themselves acknowledge. It remains therefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external things, it must be by reason, inferring their existence from what is immediately perceived by sense. But what reason can induce us to believe the existence of bodies without the mind, from what we perceive, since the very patrons of Matter themselves do not pretend there is any necessary connexion betwixt them and our ideas? I say it is granted on all hands (and what happens in dreams, phrensies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have now, though there were no bodies existing without resembling them. Hence, it is evident the supposition of external bodies is not necessary for the producing our ideas; since it is granted they are produced sometimes, and might possibly be produced always in the same order, we see them in at present, without their concurrence.

side of the road is bordered by scrubby trees of the never-failing

19. But, though we might possibly have all our sensations without them, yet perhaps it may be thought easier to conceive and explain the manner of their production, by supposing external bodies in their likeness rather than otherwise; and so it might be at least probable there are such things as bodies that excite their ideas in our minds. But neither can this be said; for, though we give the materialists their external bodies, they by their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced; since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner body can act upon spirit, or how it is possible it should imprint any idea in the mind. Hence it is evident the production of ideas or sensations in our minds can be no reason why we should suppose Matter or corporeal substances, since that is acknowledged to remain equally inexplicable with or without this supposition. If therefore it were possible for bodies to exist without the mind, yet to hold they do so, must needs be a very precarious opinion; since it is to suppose, without any reason at all, that God has created innumerable beings that are entirely useless, and serve to no manner of purpose.

20. In short, if there were external bodies, it is impossible we should ever come to know it; and if there were not, we might have the very same reasons to think there were that we have now. Suppose- what no one can deny possible- an intelligence without the help of external bodies, to be affected with the same train of sensations or ideas that you are, imprinted in the same order and with like vividness in his mind. I ask whether that intelligence hath not all the reason to believe the existence of corporeal substances, represented by his ideas, and exciting them in his mind, that you can possibly have for believing the same thing? Of this there can be no question- which one consideration were enough to make any reasonable person suspect the strength of whatever arguments be may think himself to have, for the existence of bodies without the mind.

21. Were it necessary to add any farther proof against the existence of Matter after what has been said, I could instance several of those errors and difficulties (not to mention impieties) which have sprung from that tenet. It has occasioned numberless controversies and disputes in philosophy, and not a few of far greater moment in religion. But I shall not enter into the detail of them in this place, as well because I think arguments a posteriori are unnecessary for confirming what has been, if I mistake not, sufficiently demonstrated a priori, as because I shall hereafter find occasion to speak somewhat of them.

22. I am afraid I have given cause to think I am needlessly prolix in handling this subject. For, to what purpose is it to dilate on that which may be demonstrated with the utmost evidence in a line or two, to any one that is capable of the least reflexion? It is but looking into your own thoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive it possible for a sound, or figure, or motion, or colour to exist without the mind or unperceived. This easy trial may perhaps make you see that what you contend for is a downright contradiction. Insomuch that I am content to put the whole upon this issue:- If you can but conceive it possible for one extended movable substance, or, in general, for any one idea, or anything like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the cause. And, as for all that compages of external bodies you contend for, I shall grant you its existence, though you cannot either give me any reason why you believe it exists, or assign any use to it when it is supposed to exist. I say, the bare possibility of your opinions being true shall pass for an argument that it is so.

23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it; but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose; it only shews you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind: but it does not shew that you can conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind. To make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in itself. A little attention will discover to any one the truth and evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on any other proofs against the existence of material substance.



Latest articles

Random articles

  • barter. Money was scarcely worth anything, but their eagerness
  • hymns to me, I know very well I am no goddess, and grow
  • name, and offering five hundred pounds reward for his apprehension:
  • why, you wretch,” says she, turning round to Colonel
  • numbers. I never saw anything more obliging and humble
  • pride, and that the Eye all-seeing shall find you in the
  • The long-debated peace had been proclaimed this year at
  • worked still. The spring had not been touched for years,
  • moving westward. Then, one day, he announced that half
  • I have no eyes but for you.’ Camilla hath as good a curtsy
  • gentlemen would be making riding parties together; Mrs.
  • his fate. He died by the bloody sword which already had
  • fowls, sheep, goats, pigs, horses, and cattle; the order
  • his wrongs and his rage against mankind. I have always
  • says my General, bowing very politely, “my table hath
  • fought their enemies, flogged and bullied in their service,
  • On went the Eurasian, up to her waist in the flood, with
  • extreme pressure. He deplored my lord’s perversion, but
  • the very finest of linen; the two ladies insisting on making
  • racking her little head to know what we have been saying.
  • to have a good idea of time, was employed to strike the
  • have stopped at Canterbury to run after a barmaid there,
  • depth of Marlborough’s fall was when he humbly sent to
  • “I take the little beast!” says the Doctor, starting
  • that belief he had made no effort to find her after his
  • sporting around her. Years ago, a boy on that very bed,
  • of party but of faith; their belief was a passion; either
  • where my lord, it was expected, would soon join them. But,
  • she had come to believe, since otherwise he would have
  • me, and asked how I SPELT my name? ‘Madam,’ says I,
  • one, than he could lose his consciousness of yesterday.
  • “And Marquis of Esmond, my lord,” says his Grace, with
  • good old blooms of northern Europe which My Dear had so
  • seen the nymph in the opera-machine go up to the clouds
  • name, and offering five hundred pounds reward for his apprehension:
  • St. John, whispering to Colonel Esmond in French; “it
  • the ray of light from Max's lamp impinged upon the opening
  • her son’s hand, and looking towards Colonel Esmond with
  • could she? I remember him kind and handsome, but so stupid,
  • to his lodgings, and met Mr. Addison on the road that night,
  • The other he ordered straight westward with orders to halt
  • into the old presses where Holt’s books and papers had
  • in the dark, and behold ’tis an old friend. We may shake
  • and speaking in her sweet low tones. “Doesn’t the blush
  • up the steps, depositing her there with her back to the
  • the tavern by his thrifty wife; and he talked of Cousin
  • people. Her mother and kinsman both fell into her ways,
  • to the awful Dispenser of death and life, of good and evil
  • skin, how he had passed the night. He seemed perfectly
  • Mr. Esmond said, “No doubt he should come by his name
  • tags